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Corporate Governance and Strategic Human Resources Management (SHRM) in the UK 
Financial Services Sector: The Case of the RBS 
Introduction 
The 2007-9 global financial services crisis (GFC) has caused financial services organizations, 
particularly the banking sector in developed economies, to suffer from an unprecedented decline 
in their reputations with the general public (Reputation Institute, 2011; Smallman, McDonald & 
Muller, 2010).  This decline, driven by public perceptions of poor corporate governance and 
ethics, HRM and leadership (Cooper, 2009) and films such as ‘Inside Job’ and ‘The Flaw’, 
matters a great deal because financial services companies rely heavily on their reputations to 
generate new business (Reputation Institute, 2011).    Consequently, some academics and 
companies are beginning to look beyond the dominant shareholder value model of corporate 
governance that characterized American and British financial services from the 1980s onwards 
(Davis, 2009) to alternatives to rebuild their reputations with key stakeholders.  On this issue, a 
choice is typically posited between shareholder value and and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
1984), in which there has been a resurgence of interest (Agle et al., 2008; Jensen, 2011).  
However, we argue that this choice is incomplete because it is too restrictive.   Other models are 
available that are less polarized between the competing tenets of shareholder value and 
stakeholder theory (Aguilera, Filatochev, Gospel & Jackson, 2008) and are potentially more able 
to capture the reality of corporate governance in financial services., We also argue that current 
corporate governance and SHRM theory is incomplete because it glosses over the relationships 
between these different models of governance and organizational/SHRM variables.  Thus, we 
believe this present study helps readers to gain insights into what alternatives need to be 
incorporated into choices among governance models and how they relate to business ethics, 
SHRM, organizational climate governance and the role of HR.  We do so by outlining a 
simplified version of a new configuration model (Authors, 2011) and show how it can shed light 
on the current crisis in financial services in the UK drawing on a case study of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), which was the most dramatic of a series of British bank failures following the 
GFC in 2008.  This case highlights the strengths and limitations of our configuration framework, 
so making a contribution to theory and practice in SHRM generally and the financial services 
industry in particular.      
A Framework for Linking SHRM to Corporate Governance in the Global Financial 
Services Sector 
Recent corporate governance research has attempted to broaden its focus from shareholder 
behavior and board composition, etc., (e.g. Walton & Walton, 2010) to understanding the 
‘mechanisms (used) to ensure that executives respect the rights and interests of company 
stakeholders, and that those stakeholders are held accountable for acting morally and responsibly 
for the generation, protection and distribution of wealth invested in the firm’ (Aguilera, et al, 
2008, p 475; Aguilera & Jackson, in press).     It is clear from cases in the UK financial services 
sector that some companies and executives have failed to act responsibly and/ or ethically in 
balancing their wealth creation and wealth protection roles, in much the same way as their 
American counterparts (Davis, 2009; Filatochev, 2005; Kerr & Robinson, 2011; Smallman, 
McDonald & Mueller, 2010). Moreover, trends in executive pay have resulted in debates over 
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distributional issues, especially over whether extraordinarily high bonuses for senior executives 
and traders can be ethically and economically justified (Core & Guay, 2010; Filatochev & 
Allcock, 2010).  Yet, with only a few exceptions, the mainstream HRM literature has been 
relatively silent on these topics (exceptions include Boxall and Purcell 2011; DTI/Kings College, 
2005; Farndale, Paauwe & Boselie, 2010; Legge, 1995; Pfeffer, 2010;Spector, 2003).  Instead  it 
has had an arguably myopic focus on economic performance (Boselie, Brewster & Paauwe, 
2009; Ghoshal, 2005; Pfeffer, 2010) and the  employee attitudes, behaviors and HR governance 
models that underpin it (Wood, 2009)  .     
To help fill this gap we introduce a simplified version of a new framework (see Table 1), which 
classifies literature linking corporate governance to SHRM according to answers to a general 
question concerning the future of market economies and the applicability of the US business 
model to global financial services companies (Davies, 2009; Whitley, 2009), the nature of 
corporate leadership (Hamel, 2007), ‘sustainable’ organizations (Pfeffer, 2010), and the nature of 
SHRM (Huselid & Becker, 2010; Boselie, Brewster & Paauwe, 2009).  This question is: what is 
the correct balance that organizations and their boards should seek between economic 
performance and social legitimacy, or to put it another way: how ‘soulful’ should/can the 
corporation be (Belkin, 2003; Davis, 2009; Reich, 2007)?   
Insert Table 1 about here 
The traditional answer has been framed as a choice between two options.  The first  can be 
characterized by Milton Friedman’s (Sept 13th, 1970)  classical dictum that companies maximize 
social welfare by using resources and engaging in activities which maximize profits over time, so 
long as they do so ‘in open and free competition without deception or fraud’ (p. 4).  This position 
is closely linked with the traditional shareholder value model of corporate governance, which 
emerged in the 1980s.  This model drew on the economic tenets of agency theory, which 
proposed the use of ‘high powered’ incentives to align managerial agents with shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976),  and on transaction cost theory and the efficient markets hypothesis  
to justify market –based forms of governance structures (Williamson, 1985).  In essence, these 
were arguments for the importance of equity capital and largely unregulated financial markets 
that dominated economic thinking and board governance until the GFC (Davis, 2009; Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995).   
The second option, which has its origins in criticisms of unfettered free markets (Cooper, 2009; 
Daily, Dalton & Canella, 2005;  Ghosal, 2005), suggests that sustainable economic performance 
of organizations rests on company boards’ role modeling virtuous behavior by meeting changing 
societal expectations, thus creating ‘soulful’ (Wirtenberger, 1969; Davis, 2005), ‘altruistic’ 
(Jones, Felps & Begley, 2007); or ‘sustainable’ organizations (Pfeffer, 2010).  These theories 
raise social obligations, especially to employees and society, to the same (or even greater) plane 
as short term economic performance.  In essence, this is an argument for patient capital and for 
greater regulation of financial markets and sustainability.  This position is closely linked with a 
stakeholder perspective on governance and organizations, which are found in certain varieties of 
capitalism  and seeks to widen the scope of claims made on the firm to include any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by an organization (Freeman, 1984).   
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However, while much of the governance research has been restricted to comparing these two 
options, recent work has argued that other choices or perspectives are possible.  Thus Clark 
(2007) has discussed an enlightened shareholder value perspective, which became popular post-
Enron.  Though still committed to shareholder value, this perspective was  adopted by 
organizations as a means of rescuing or re-imaging the traditional shareholder value model.   
This model reflects executives’ desires to temper pure self-interested, egoist ethics with Kantian 
moral duties to treat people with respect, to see them as a key resource in strategic competition to 
be invested in, and to be managed through the application of ‘soft power’ (Courpasson, 2000) 
and sophisticated HRM (Guest et al, 2003).   
More recently,   Aguilera, et al (2008) have proposed a fourth option – a context-dependent 
model.  Thus firms may choose different corporate governance approaches for different parts of 
their business or at different times, depending on how successful or acceptable they are in 
different contexts.   This is more of a contextualized hybrid model, based on a relativist ethical 
position, an embedded-in-context strategic management approach (Whittington, 2000) and 
concomitant SHRM, organizational climate and leadership approaches, often using a mixture of 
soft and hard power and HRM techniques. 
We believe our configuration framework contributes to the literature by showing how these four 
options have different implications for SHRM (including leadership philosophies and 
approaches), the governance of organizational climate, and the role and governance of the HR 
function in financial services.  However, this relationship is a reciprocal one. Just as the 
shareholder value model of corporate governance, which dominated financial services in the US 
and the UK from the 1980s until recently, has had implications for talent management by 
selecting, developing and rewarding executives whose values fit an organizational rationale 
based on maximizing share price, these same executives did a great deal to create performance-
oriented organizational climates and corporate governance frameworks in their own image..   It 
should be noted that these configurations are ideal types in the sense of being theoretical 
abstractions rather than normative models, allowing reference to a more complex reality to be 
established for the purposes of contrast and comparison of ideas for research, in this case in the 
financial services sector.  So, can such a framework help us analyze the implications of the GFC 
for SHRM and vice versa? 
Developments in the UK Financial Services Sector: RBS as a Case in Point.  
To assess the relevance of our framework to the GFC, we have used a single case study 
approach, drawing on an interpretivist philosophy (Burrell & Morgan, 1982) and qualitative 
research methods using semi-structured interviews.  We have also used archival methods to 
provide a historically-grounded case, from a review of academic literature mentioning RBS, 
press reports and official RBS documentation.   The case has been chosen because it represents 
the most high-profile impact of the GFC on the UK banking sector and one of the most 
spectacular corporate failures in British economic history.  In 2007, RBS was one of the world’s 
most successful private sector banks ranking fourth in the world in Tier 1 capital but had to be 
rescued by the British government in 2008.  It is now 83% owned by the UK taxpayer and has 
slipped to 14th in the Tier 1 rankings.  The case also provides a real-time, ‘soft-test’ of our 
framework in Table 1 by examining: (a) the extent to which the case can be analyzed and 
explained by changes from one configuration to another, thus validating the   integrity of three of 
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our configurations – traditional shareholder value, enlightened shareholder value and stakeholder 
models - as analytical abstractions, and (b)  the conditions under which a context-dependent 
configuration might provide a more useful explanatory insight.       
In-depth interviews were conducted with eight former and current senior RBS HR executives, 
who have provided unique insights. Data analysis combined an inductive focus to identify 
categories of meaning with deductive theoretical questioning (Richardson &Kramer, 2006).  The 
interrogation of literature and interviews addressed the impact of changes in ownership on ethics, 
strategy and SHRM in RBS.   During the interviews, we asked questions relevant to our 
framework concerning leadership, organizational culture and SHRM approach prior to the crisis, 
how these related to governance, ethics and strategy, whether  the overall configuration changed 
because of lessons learned or government directives, and if so how and why?  We also wanted to 
know whether the HRM function had become stronger or weaker as a result.   Interviews were 
transcribed and analyzed for key categories of meaning that emerged from interviewees’ 
accounts of the changing nature of HRM in the company.  Four such categories became 
apparent: the imprimatur of different CEOs on organizational culture and HRM; the focus on 
‘strategy execution’, changes in performance management and human capital management, and 
changes in leadership development.     
RBS Prior to the GFC. 
RBS was founded in 1727 in Edinburgh but remained a small local bank until the 1990s. It was 
firmly rooted in the Scottish economy and its executives were part of the Scottish establishment 
(Kerr & Robinson, 2011), pursuing paternalistic welfare policies toward  employees.   The model 
of governance resembled an early version of enlightened shareholder value, with shareholding 
narrowly held by local private investors, which more or less pertained for 250 years.  However, 
deregulation of financial services in the UK in the mid 1980s made RBS a prime candidate for 
acquisition by ambitious banks and other financial institutions.  As a consequence the board, led 
by chairman Sir George Mathewson embarked on a ‘high-leverage’ strategy by running lower-
than-industry average levels of capital to fund an expanding portfolio of new loans and off-
balance sheet investments, an approach that ultimately contributed to its failure along with many 
other financial institutions (Aikman, Haldane & Nelson, Nov, 2010).  Such a strategy was built 
on hiring more entrepreneurial managers deemed capable of fulfilling the Mathewson vision of 
expansion in Britain and overseas, and diversification into related financial services.  Reflecting 
on this strategy, one former senior manager suggested it depended on ‘stretching every pound 
and running with fewer deposits in the core banking business than was comfortable to generate 
revenues and investment capital’.  However, another commentator suggested it was more the 
work of ‘spivvy’ managers responding to huge incentives than to follow risk-adjusted strategies. 
The fulfillment of this ‘growth-through-acquisition’ strategy was placed in the hands of CEO 
Fred Goodwin, who had been informally recruited at a party by Mathewson in 1988 as deputy 
CEO.  He led a well-documented takeover of the London-based NatWest in 1990, a bank nearly 
three times its size, earning him a near-heroic reputation among the global financial community.  
Effectively, RBS ran down its capital to ‘dangerously low levels’ to purchase NatWest in a 
bitterly contested battle.  This acquisition was intended to increase revenue and profits by 
leaving the NatWest brand and branch network intact while undertaking aggressive cost cutting, 
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job losses and rationalization, especially in integrating back office functions and a proliferation 
of IT systems into the RBS platform or ‘manufacturing division’ (Gratton & Ghosal, 2005).  
RBS’s integration model worked spectacularly well, with the acquisition of NatWest producing 
$4 billion of enhanced profits and success in merging two bank cultures (Groysberg & Sherman, 
2008).  It also proved to be the making of Fred Goodwin’s high profile reputation.   
The NatWest purchase and integration became a prototype for a series of later overseas and 
domestic acquisitions.  During this period, RBS also developed a greater presence in investment 
banking, a trajectory that became common among retail banks seeking rapid growth.  The move 
into investment banking, which led to taking on riskier loans in the American sub-prime market 
during the period 2005-7, was also to prove significant in RBS’s subsequent decline.   
The final acquisition was the Dutch bank, ABN AMRO Holdings, in October 2007, a bid that 
RBS led as part of a consortium with Fortis and Banco Santander. This purchase was the largest 
ever in financial services history and was intended to help RBS diversify further into (a) retail 
banking in the US, Asia Pacific, Chinese and Indian markets, and (b) build greater capability in 
banking services and financial solutions to major corporate and financial institutions, investment 
banking and international financial management. As a consequence RBS became the world’s 
fifth largest bank by market capitalization and largest corporate and institutional bank in Europe 
employing 171,000 people in more than 50 countries, so achieving Mathewson’s and Goodwin’s 
vision of a global bank (Groysberg & Sherman, 2008; Authors, 2009). 
Until the ABN acquisition, the company’s senior management team was widely applauded by the 
global financial community.  However, the financial press and some RBS institutional 
shareholders began to question the sustainability of, and motives underlying, the board’s 
acquisition strategy and the lack of short term returns to shareholders.  Moreover, specific 
criticisms were made about the decision to go ahead with the purchase of ABN when LaSalle, 
one of the Dutch bank’s key lines of businesses in the USA and an important justification used 
by the RBS board for pursuing ABN in the first place, was sold by to another buyer.  The RBS 
board’s response to these criticisms was to push ahead regardless, although they publically stated 
that ABN would be the last major acquisition and that RBS would concentrate on organic growth 
in the future and on improving the cost-to-income ratio that impacted directly on returns to 
shareholders.   
Leadership, Organizational Culture and HRM in RBS during the Growth Period 
By combining published accounts with certain themes raised by interviewees, a coherent 
storyline emerges, which focuses on the interrelationships between strategy, leadership, culture 
and HRM, of RBS’s success until 2007.  These relationships embraced a traditional shareholder 
value model in terms of ethical underpinnings, focus on hard HRM and leader-centricity but also 
elements of the enlightened shareholder value configuration that characterized its earlier years, 
for example in the focus on development and engagement.   The specific features of leadership 
and organization culture that were used to account for success were (a) Goodwin’s directive, 
micro-leadership style, which held executives personally accountable and touched every aspect 
of organizational culture, (b) ‘strategy execution’, embodied in the strapline ‘making things 
happen’, (c) performance management and rewards systems, symbolized by a sophisticated 
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human capital management system that signified a focus on hard data  and (d) later on, a major 
investment in leadership development of the top 300 executives to reinforce certain key 
messages concerning the importance of leadership for innovation.  The success that followed led 
to a growing internal and external confidence in the personalized, directive leadership style and 
decision-making of Goodwin himself and, to a lesser extent, his senior executive team.   Such 
over-attributions of organizational success to individual personality rather than situations have 
been a core feature of the transformational leadership literature, resulting in what has been 
labeled a ‘romance with leaders’ (Grint, 2010).  One senior HR manager summed up this 
‘fundamental attributional error’ as follows: 
He (Goodwin) was probably given too much credit on the way up and came in for too much 
criticism on the way down…he came to symbolize all that was wrong with banking and the credit 
crunch.(Interviewee 1) 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the financial press and the UK government were influential 
in shaping external and employee perceptions of Goodwin’s impact on the organization. Among 
other accolades, he was named the Best Bank CEO by Reuters and was knighted by the UK  
government in 2004.   Goodwin’s personal impact was also a dominant recurring theme in 
interviewee accounts, though interviewees also reflected on its longer-term dysfunctional 
consequences. 
Leadership in RBS – the Goodwin imprimatur. Perhaps the most important symbols of the 
RBS leadership approach were the ‘signature’ morning meetings instituted by Goodwin and his 
attention to detail.  These have been well documented by Gratton & Ghoshal (2005), who 
described how these meetings signaled Goodwin’s intent to micro-manage a global organization 
by holding senior executives directly accountable for strategic and operational results.  This 
‘signature process’ involved Goodwin and his executive team meeting every morning, either 
face-to-face or through video-conferencing.  A senior member of the RBS board, explained the 
nature of these meetings: 
Fred loves the morning meeting.  It is his chance to put his imprint on whatever is 
happening….Fred is more rigorous as a manager than anyone I have ever met.  He is 
extraordinarily demanding.  For example, in the morning meetings, he will look at a budget and 
go straight to page 23 and ask about it.  He is very rigorous about apparently small things and 
this pervades the company.  People say, ‘If Fred sees this, what would he say?’ (Gratton and 
Ghosal, p 55). 
While Gratton and Ghoshal argued these meetings had great symbolic value in reinforcing the 
bank’s core values of respect, egalitarianism, straight-talking and practical action-orientation 
with ‘accountability at the heart of how the morning meeting is conducted’ (p. 56), a senior HR 
interviewee offered a more hybridized account of Goodwin’s style and the impact of these 
meetings on creating a paternalistic organizational culture and centralized decision-making: 
‘When I joined the organization it felt quite ambitious.  Externally it was perceived as aggressive 
but internally it didn’t feel like that at all.  It felt paternalistic in many ways…there was a desire 
to look after people in a controlling sort of way, a kind of parent/child relationship, we-know-
6 | P a g e  
 
best way…Decision making was also quick, up and down, which I think worked well when the 
organization was relatively small…but less so when the organization began to grow rapidly 
(reference to the ABN takeover).  (Interviewee 3). 
High energy and the focus on strategy execution were also common themes in interviewees’ 
descriptions of RBS culture (see also Gratton, 2008).  One interviewee attempted to capture the 
energy redolent in RBS:  
There was an awful lot of talk about improving ‘clock speed’ of anything and everything – from 
mowing the lawns outside to doing acquisitions….There was a culture of responsiveness, people 
moved fast around the building, there was a culture of speed – running, moving, fast…something 
that Linda Gratton noticed in her book…’(Interviewee 6). 
Interviewees also accounted for success by focusing on the ability of the company to create a 
machine-like bureaucracy that slipped into gear to implement centrally-taken strategic decisions.  
Once a decision was taken to acquire a new business, questions on strategy were played down 
and the speed and rigour of ‘execution’ played up, 
In line with the’ making things happen strapline,  you know, I guess this was where RBS was so 
successful…decisions were taken centrally…the vast majority of people were just pushed into 
execution, the machine just cut in.  And because RBS had such great processes, we could focus 
on execution…the role of senior managers and, indeed,  my role was on execution, rather the  
extent to which you were able to shape or influence strategy…and that came from a very focused 
CEO who had a clear view of what the strategy should be (Interviewee 7). 
I’ve never known an organization like it.  There was an obsession with execution…where a logo 
– making things happen -  actually reflected how an organization operated (laugh) (Interviewee 
3).  
One important issue that emerged during interviews was the nature of strategic objectives handed 
down to the HR function.  Again, these focused on the growth strategy and on managing the 
pervasive cost to income metric, which was critical to profitability and shareholder value though 
this connection was not always made.  A senior HR executive explained: 
The cost to income ratio was always being talked about in HR.  There was a phrase that was 
used extensively – ‘managing the jaws’.  Yes share price and shareholder value got a mention, 
but these were created by growth, new business opportunities, by the cost to income 
ratio….However, it never felt like cost control, no that’s the wrong word, there was a big focus 
on investments, it was never about cutting costs…(Interviewee 2) 
A focus on measurement. Interviewees emphasized evidence-based management, metrics and 
performance outcomes as a key feature of the organizational culture, pointing to numerous 
stories of Goodwin’s attention to detail and pre-occupation with measurement and his impact on 
other managers.  
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… he had an obsessive attention to detail, and his managers copied his style to get on.  For 
example, he would ask about the (evaluation) scores on Course code xyz (in the new Business 
School).  What’s the average score, what’s the trend?...  He wanted to know why we were using 
a case on Tesco on the (executive development) courses… I saw a hand-written note from Fred, 
querying this…and his acolytes would mirror Fred’s style (Interviewee 8).   
There was a focus on data.  Data was everything.  I remember Fred coming along to an HR 
conference and saying I have only three words to say to you – attrition, attrition, attrition.  He 
wanted to know why there were 23-24% attrition rates in turnover in the first year (of 
employment in a particular division) (Interviewee 6).  
The human capital strategy. This last quotation shows the importance of human capital 
strategy.  RBS’s HR team became known internationally as a benchmark for excellent HR 
practice through its sophisticated approach to human capital metrics and leadership development.   
Much has been written about RBS’s human capital strategy in practitioner-oriented articles 
(Institute of Employment Services, date; Groysberg & Sherman, 2008), which represented the 
apogee of rationality applied to the measurement of leader performance and impact on 
organizational effectiveness.  Annual employee, surveys, regular ‘pulse’ surveys  and  
benchmarking of employee engagement with other financial services and global high-performing 
companies were developed in the late 1990s, revealing different drivers for employee 
engagement in different regions.  However, the focus on leadership and its impact on 
engagement, customer service and cost to income ratios were common.  A Leadership Index, 
using standardized metrics across the RBS Group, revealed a significant correlation between 
leadership performance and outcome measures of performance.  This combination of measures 
were turned into a Human Capital Toolkit to help managers and HR business partners ‘diagnose 
issues, develop interventions, share best practices and measure the effectiveness of their people 
strategy…’ (Groysberg & Sherman, 2008, p 10) and rolled out into their international retail 
banking sector.  These Harvard academics claim  it is one of the most impressive online tools 
anywhere linking people management, sales, customer service and financial performance 
metrics.  Importantly, managers were measured, made accountable and rewarded on how well 
they met key metrics, including employee engagement and satisfaction. The metrics also 
provided the basis for talent management segmentation and performance assessment, which 
became extensively used for career development purposes.    
Interviewees also suggested that ‘delivery’ and ‘getting things done’ were the most valued 
leadership competence. 
What RBS was always good at was making things happen, integration, meeting targets, big 
program management, with a set of measure deliverables…the key competence was a burning 
drive for results, and that was by far most important…(Interviewee 1) 
Thus, RBS’s approach to human capital management became one of its signature processes and 
the benchmark for UK companies in all sectors to follow.  Data from the constant surveys of 
employees also highlighted how success, supported by investment in people, was leading to a 
growing confidence in the organization: 
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RBS as an organization became very confident organization from its execution of the NatWest 
acquisition, and you could see why.  It was a very successful acquisition….  Having been on the 
NatWest side, I would say they did incredibly well in integration….  What came with that was 
investment….  People drew on the confidence and energy of the organization (Interviewee 5). 
During the period 2003-7, employee perceptions of key indicators rose significantly, particularly 
leadership, internal beliefs about the external image of RBS, innovation, communication, respect 
and diversity, and employee engagement.  They also enjoyed high ‘favourability’ scores on 
employment security, working relationships and recognition and reward against the global 
financial services norm, a benchmarking measure developed by a consulting firm.  Significantly, 
however, employee engagement scores were below the financial industry norm, interpreted 
internally as problems with leadership style in the organization, to which we return in the 
following sections.  Nevertheless, the general thrust of the metrics provided substantial evidence 
that the overall HR strategy was effective and improving over time.   
A focus on leadership development. As already noted, the metrics pointed to leadership quality 
being the most important driver of employee, customer, sales and financial performance.  For 
example, beliefs by employees that their business was well-managed ranked as the most 
important factor in explaining variations in employee engagement scores in different countries 
(Authors, 2009).  Thus, providing leadership development became a key element in RBS’s  
talent management strategy.  Consequently, it established a state-of-the-art business school in 
2006 in Edinburgh to develop its most promising senior executives, in which Goodwin took a 
close interest because he believed he could use it to further shape corporate culture.  RBS 
established links with leading US schools such as Harvard to deliver executive education 
programs rather than UK schools.  This was intended to reflect the global nature of the company 
and to meet the increasing aspirations of its ‘top talent’ segment to be associated with a major 
global company.  A senior executive explained in an interview conducted in 2006: 
RBS is now a global organization.  It needs to ensure that it has the best senior execs 
to work internationally…  Executive education must have a global perspective, ….The 
Scottish business schools are too UK-centric….  Our senior executives expect to work 
with the best schools in the world… (Interviewee 2). 
 
Reflections on RBS during its Growth Period: The Problems of Shareholder Value 
Reflections on leadership. By 2007, it became clear that this romance with Goodwin’s 
leadership style and perceptions of his positive impact were waining.  Reflecting a important 
theme in the leadership literature concerning the dysfunctional consequences of managerial 
hubris, narcissism and executive overconfidence (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Shipman & 
Mumford, 2011), the collective self-confidence in RBS, built on Goodwin and his executive 
committee’s reputation for making ‘the right calls’, was increasingly seen internally as collective 
arrogance.  Interviewees linked it to the centralized, directive, micro-management style of 
Goodwin and his executive team and impact on organizational culture, and on a general 
unwillingness of his direct reports ‘to speak up to power’:  
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I would say that confidence became more arrogance, with each successive acquisition…the one 
thing that concerned me was the growing arrogance, and that generated a lot of personal 
agendas, which started to override team, or organizational or functional agendas…. I think the 
personal agendas came from the attributes that were rewarded, things like ‘burning drive for 
results’, things like ‘creating tension to catalyse change’.  These were key aspects of the 
behavioural leadership model, which were seen as probably more important than some of the 
other, perhaps softer management or leadership skills’(Interviewee 5) 
Another interviewee suggested that this was the point he became convinced that confident 
judgment became arrogance: 
If you look at the later stages…the ABN takeover, the transaction originally had the LaSalle 
piece in it…that fell through, but by that stage RBS was so close to the deal and had made such a 
big thing about beating Barclays, it still went full steam ahead.  Analysts were saying pull away, 
but they didn’t because of that arrogant streak…. it seems like they just wanted the deal done…I 
think to show it had the strength and ability to say, sort of, look, we’ve done it again, despite 
what people say (Interviewee 7). 
Published and interviewee accounts also highlighted the corrosive impact the morning meetings 
had on leadership style throughout the company.  For example, an Economist (2009) analysis 
proposed that the morning meetings were Goodwin’s method of maintaining tight control 
behavior and to set the tone and boundaries for legitimate leadership in RBS.  ‘Ritual 
humiliation’ was seen as a ‘right of passage’.  Two former senior HR managers described how 
these meetings negatively influenced leadership style throughout the organization: 
I would sum up the RBS leadership style in a few words, it was a bullying culture…it was very 
command and control, get things done, really carrot and stick approach.  This came directly 
from Goodwin himself.   This was his style, which his senior management team emulated…in one 
sense they had to get on.  People conformed to Goodwin’s style.  It was considered OK to bully 
people; his behavior legitimized it..(Interviewee 8) 
It became quite a cool thing to do, to be seen to be seen in a meeting, to be quite abrasive, to be 
seen at times perhaps, you know, to push people back, to stand people down…I think at times it 
bordered on bullying… (Interviewee 6) 
Other interviewees, however, pointed to the lack of ‘responsible followership’ (Kellerman, 2008) 
in standing up to power, thus helping sustain Goodwin’s personal impact: 
Outside of the senior management group, there was probably limited ability to challenge 
decisions…I think from Fred and his team, but in reality Fred himself.  His direct reports were 
clearly influenced by Fred’s own agenda.  He was very capable, very clever, but he was also 
feared…’(Interviewee 6) 
It was fantastically paradoxical.  It was a mono-culture all built around Fred Goodwin, he was 
the driver….He wanted people to challenge him, but when they didn’t come forward, I guess 
stand up to him, he just ‘steam-rollered’ on….  
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This resulted in further negative aspects of strong cultures built around a single leader or small 
leadership team  
Coming from (a highly respected professional services firm) I found RBS to be very insular from 
the rest of the world outside, a kind of ‘we’ve always done it this way, so why change’ culture.  
This came from the very top….I don’t think it was as entrepreneurial as people made out 
….(Interviewee 8) 
Reflections on Performance Management, Metrics and HR. These reflections on the 
dysfunctional consequences of the overall approach to management in RBS also extended to the 
performance management system, the human capital system and to rewards. 
Performance management was very strong in the Bank, but it was very subjective…I would say 
there was a great deal of misuse of the ‘Bell Curve’ (the practice of forced distribution to ensure 
that performance reflected a normal distribution), so that people fitted the curve.  It didn’t really 
matter about absolute levels of performance, managers were forced into relative performance.  
Nor did behaviours matter, what counted was achieving targets and that is what people were 
rewarded for!(Interviewee 8) 
This attention to detail and measurement was seen positively and negatively.  
The HR engagement survey was treated very seriously, every year each manager was rated on 
engagement and the scores were literally placed on the door.  Managers as they trooped into the 
auditorium could see the red, amber and green scores on the door, and knew who would be in 
for a hard time.  One of the real paradoxes in RBS was Fred (Goodwin) shouting – ‘you will be 
good to your people’ (laughter).  Maybe that explains the high response rates…(Interviewee 4). 
RBS Post GFC: A More Enlightened Shareholder Value Configuration? 
Reasons for Failure. As previously noted, RBS entered into a joint venture with Fortis and 
Santander in 2007 to acquire the Dutch bank, ABN AMRO, which had presence in 53 countries.  
The bid was successful and they acquired ABN for $106 billion in October 2007.  However, 
there were early warning signals when some analysts portrayed as ‘price-aggressive’ and 
overpaying for the deal.  Nevertheless, RBS had gained confidence through its history of 
successful acquisitions and expected the ABN takeover to be equally successful if they applied 
the same strategic integration formula. Unfortunately, the purchase took place just when the GFC 
began to bite, which, according to most analysts, was the beginnings of a ‘perfect storm’ facing 
RBS. In the summer of 2007, negative signs of a recession were clearly visible as a consequence 
of the ‘credit crunch’ associated with the sub-prime mortgage backed securities (collateralized 
debt obligations) in the USA.   ABN was heavily exposed to these toxic US securities, for which 
RBS were subsequently criticized for not exercising due diligence.   
The RBS response to this crisis was to undertake a £12 billion rights issue (Euroweek, 2008), at 
the time the largest in the history of any company.  This move turned into a source of humiliation 
for CEO Fred Goodwin and his board, and led to further questions over the justification of the 
ABN AMRO deal.  The rights issue failed, so after decades of success in the UK banking history 
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and having become one of the biggest banks of the world, RBS went into free-fall in 2008 and 
within no time reached the brink of collapse.  The UK government had to step in with massive 
cash injections, so the Bank rapidly became effectively state-owned.  In October 2008, the 
Bank’s board asked Sir Fred Goodwin to retire to avoid being sacked. The bank was then taken 
over by the UK government, which intervened to shore up the collapsing UK financial system;  
RBS alone recorded losses of £24 billion in February 2009. Sir Fred Goodwin and Sir Tom 
McKillop (the Chairman), along with other senior bankers caught up in the crisis, were 
questioned by a Treasury Select Committee of MPs at Westminster in February 2009. These 
bankers were forced to apologize for their behavior, admitting that the purchase of ABN Amro 
was a “bad mistake” despite their defense that it was the credit crunch that had been the cause of 
failure. (The Scotsman, 11 February, 2009).  McKillop admitted they had overpaid for ABN, 
reflecting that they had ‘bought at the top of the market’, and what they had paid ‘was not worth 
it’  One of the major causes for RBS’s failure, and indeed all of the British banks, was deemed to 
be the executive bonus culture that encouraged overly-risky behavior, a point borne out in recent 
research..     
A Change in Leadership Style. A new CEO, Stephen Hester,  was appointed in early 2009 
because of his previous experience in leading a turnaround at another large UK financial services 
firm.  His appointment also led to a new board being appointed, with only two former directors 
remaining by May 2009.   This executive group is currently faced with trying to keep talented 
people in the business and restoring employees’ faith in senior managers while trying to reduce 
the company’s overall size, restore it to profitability and to private sector ownership. EU 
requirements following the GFC led to RBS selling off its insurance companies, 318 retail 
banking branches and part of its investment banking business over a four-year period.  The 
consequences were significant job losses, with 19,700 being made redundant since October 
2008,  of which 13,700 were in the UK.  As a result, employee engagement levels ‘tanked’, as 
one interviewee commented, which were poorest in the lines of businesses most affected, for 
example, insurance and investment banking.   
Moreover, there was a widespread feeling among many employees that the senior leadership had 
let them down (CIPD, 2009).  The, former HR Director, explained: 
I think a number of people felt let down. Also, we had very high employee share ownership and a 
lot of people are unhappy about that [because the share price crashed]. There are a lot of people 
who were hurt, whose pride was hurt, and many people were disappointed in the leadership 
(CIPD, Dec 3rd 2009, p 2) 
Thus, Hester and his board sought to signal a more appropriate leadership style and 
organizational culture.  They developed a group-wide strategy comprising five new themes: a 
15% return on equity; top-tier competitive position in leading customer franchises, proportionate 
use of balance sheet risk and funding, organic growth, and a new customer charter (CIPD, 2009). 
Leadership and HRM in a New Environment. The RBS board and the HR function have faced 
significant challenges in rescuing the failed bank and keeping staff engaged so that they work 
towards its revival.  The RBS corporate sustainability report, which records key ‘scores’ from 
their human capital survey, showed a significant decline of 12% and 16% in job satisfaction and 
engagement, and employment security in 2008-9.  Our interviews, however, showed that lessons 
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have been learned that resulted in changes taking place.  Nevertheless, their story was of 
continuity as well as change, reflecting cultural inertia in certain parts of the business and 
tensions in what is regarded as a temporary change in ownership, since both the UK government 
and the RBS board are keen that the company returns to private ownership as soon as is 
practicable.  Equally important, however, RBS had developed a reputation for excellent HR 
practice prior to the GFC.  As one interviewee succinctly put it: 
It is easy to say that before crisis, RBS was this and after crisis, it was that, but that is too 
simple.  Obviously things went wrong, but there was and still is a lot of very good practice in HR 
and that hasn’t changed overnight (Interviewee 1) 
We reflect on these changes raised by our HR interviewees who remained with the business after 
the crisis, the most significant of which were in leadership style and its impact on organizational 
culture, best characterized as a move from the use of ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ power (Courpasson, 2000).   
Hester and his board were seen to signal a new culture of open and regular communication so 
that employees could engage with senior leaders over the RBS’s future.  The new CEO 
immediately introduced a system of conferences and calls between himself and his most senior 
managers, requiring them to cascade information throughout the organization.  This change was 
informed by data that highlighted failings in the previous leadership culture according to the 
human capital metrics.  As one senior HR manager explained: 
It was very obvious from the data that the leadership style was very delivery focused, we had the 
data to prove it, we brought it along to meetings, saying if you compare us with global high 
performing companies, our leaders are going to need more collaboration, more influencing 
skills.  They are going to need the ability to, you know, manage tensions.  This is the gap and we 
have put in a big program of work to fill that gap, to send signals that other things are 
important…(following prompt) a more balanced scorecard approach.  We saw a spike in (name 
of division) where they had a spike around ‘burning drive’, which we have been working on a 
lot….(Interviewee 3) 
These changes in leadership were partly attributed to the role modeling impact of Hester, and his 
chairman, Sir Philip Hampton, who provocatively declared that RBS was ‘paying big salaries to 
staff who are not worth it’.  The former Group HR director, in a published interview in 2009 
suggested that: 
‘Stephen has a very different style to Fred [Goodwin]…. A little bit less formal, a bit more 
relaxed. Both were interested in results, but he is much more focused on communication and 
performance management. (CIPD, December 3rd, 2009, p 1) 
Another senior HR manager pointed to the importance of restoring faith in senior leadership: 
Change starts from the top, this is always necessary.  It isn’t just the Chief Executive, but 
undoubtedly there is a different role modeling going on at very senior levels and that gets 
cascaded down into the organization….The messages from the Group Executive now are much 
more about the need for new behaviours, we never used to talk about behaviours, we never really 
used to talk about values…we are starting to talk about these a little bit more now (Interviewee 
2) 
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Changes in Values, Talent Management and Leadership. However, these changes have been 
unevenly spread throughout the organization.  Attesting to the importance and strength of local 
subcultures, another interviewee explained: 
What we began to do in other parts of the business, still hasn’t affected (x division)…So if I look 
at the leadership index in other divisions, there is still a spike around a burning drive for results 
(Interviewee 2). 
Changes were also evident in the emphasis on values supporting RBS’s new customer charter 
and its social responsibility pronouncements.  Again these changes were attributed to the new 
board of RBS.  However, the following insight also highlights a key dilemma faced by the 
company in meeting its stakeholder obligations: 
What we also talk about more is the core purpose of the organization and the social good it does.   
But it’s talked about in a fairly subtle way because there is still a challenge over how you present 
the organization externally at the moment…I think we need to fix things first, sort things out 
before you start these sorts of things...(asked to elaborate).  Well I mean at group level it’s not 
the right thing to be coming up with values because we are in the middle of a five-year plan, to 
get to the point where we have to stand alone as a business.  Until you’ve got that, well that’s 
what we’ve got to deliver for the taxpayers and quite rightly so, to get their money back 
essentially, and that’s got to be our number one priority, but there is also recognition…a very 
clear signal that there is a different style of leadership, a more open style, a more collaborative 
approach, you know, a more considered, thoughtful approach (Interviewee 3). 
These changes were reflected in new approaches to performance management emphasizing the 
means of achieving results as well as the results themselves.  Such a change is indicitive of a 
change in business ethics from egoism to a Kantian morally correct duty to treat people as ends 
in themselves.  It is also backed by the influence of new external regulation from the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA): 
(Following probe) To give you some examples, we are using behaviours for performance 
assessment….it’s not just about what you’ve delivered but how you’ve delivered it… 
There is a big focus on performance management and the need for personal development for 
leaders – we have 360 degree for that, so that behaviours measured through the appraisal 
system…All executives and direct reports are to get a 360 degree (Interviewee 3). 
It is different now, yes, I think things like the FSA regulations require our executives to have 
….have completed a performance review.  This is just good practice, but now we have to 
evidence it (Interviewee 2). 
According to interviewees, the focus on a new approach to talent management and leadership 
development has also been noticeable.  One of the most important of these changes in policy has 
been a move away from recruiting externally to developing people internally: 
We also have a new leadership framework for behaviours, what we expect of our leaders, and 
people are being measured against them.  That’s a key change, but it depends on the business.  I 
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don’t see it as an enormous change from previously in the division I was previously in, but in 
other parts of the business, it is a big change (Interviewee 5). 
Another documented change was a greater focus on innovation, with leadership development in 
the business school being used to generate new ideas, especially in retail banking.  Sessions have 
been introduced into the leadership development program, which have led to new revenue 
streams.  Leadership development has also focused on creating more effective leaders at all 
levels in the organization by helping them gain the skills to teach, based on the belief that you 
can’t know something until you have to teach it (Mostyn, 2010)  
HR as ‘an Un-indicted Co-conspirator’.  Finally, an internal and external debate has taken 
place over HR’s role in RBS being ‘part of the problem’ or even helping cause the problem 
(Spector, 2003).  The former Group HR Director , in a published interview HR Magazine in 
October 2010 answered his many HR critics in the blogosphere: 
I’m not absolving myself totally…(but) I can’t see what HR could have done.  Lack of money was 
not an HR issue, the portfolios our businesses kept was not an HR issue; none of them were.  I 
wasn’t running the bank…the CEO makes the decisions, not me. People think HR runs 
companies.  I say stop getting carried away.  HR is a support function, no more, no less 
important than sales or IT.  HR critics are way ahead of themselves…He (Stephen Hester, when 
he took over) said he didn’t see HR as part of the problem…’(p.1). 
He further asserted: 
Culture issues were secondary issues, not primary ones…HR isn’t responsible for the culture of 
the business; the board and its customers are.  It’s the business environment that sets the 
culture…I’ve always thought pay in this sector is mad…a lot of staff were angry with the 
leadership and their bonuses and rightly so…’ (p.2). 
However, some interviewees suggested that the ability of the HR function to absolve itself from 
blame and for responsibility for organizational culture may be changing, since Hester has already 
gone on record to say that  ‘Shareholders have raised concerns about our ability to keep and 
motivate good people…(this is) our single greatest problem’ 
Thus as one interviewee stated that while in some divisions it was asked to hold up a mirror to 
senior executives and encouraged to do so, there was a feeling that the new senior management 
team was asking the function to become guardians of the corporate conscience: 
The HR function wasn’t too blame for what had happened in the past, or wasn’t powerful enough 
to prevent excesses, but now it was being asked to be more responsible and accountable its role 
for hold up the mirror, in some parts of the business at least (Interviewee 2). 
Conclusions 
In this study, we have outlined a new framework linking corporate governance to SHRM and 
used it to analyze the case study of RBS as an illustration of the GFC’s impact in the UK 
financial services sector.   We believe that both shed new light on a wider range of corporate 
governance configurations than the traditional shareholder value-stakeholder dichotomy that 
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dominates the literature, and on the relationships between these alternatives models of 
governance and their ethical, strategic, SHRM, leadership, organizational climate and HR 
governance concomitants in financial services and other sectors.    The configuration model has 
helped us to map out and analyze relationships among these variables and to show how changes 
in governance regimes often move in tandem with changes in ethics, strategy, SHRM and 
climate governance, and the role of HR.   However, as the case of RBS shows, these 
configurations are only theoretical abstractions that do not quite capture the complex reality 
found in cases of the large-scale organizational change brought about by the GFC in UK banks.    
One possible reading of the case is of RBS changing from a traditional shareholder value 
configuration to enlightened shareholder value one post GFC, which for some people represents 
one of the few positive outcomes of the GFC.  The Mathewson-Goodwin era can be 
characterized by a traditional shareholder value-hard power model which was in tune with the 
financial economics of the period, the opportunities created by deregulation of financial services 
and the strategy to grow through acquisition to satisfy shareholders and executive aspirations for 
a global business.   The organization pre-GFC was characterized by egoist ethics,  a focus on 
measurement, human capital and leader-centricity, with the HR function playing a limited role at 
board level.  The case also reveals a weakness in the HR function’s ability to help leaders to 
reflect on their leadership style and organizational culture to bring about change..   
Post GFC, it is possible to read into the case a more enlightened shareholder value configuration, 
with senior leadership, organizational climate and SHRM more consistent with a corporate 
governance regime and change in ethics that was demanded by a change in ownership to the UK 
taxpayer. RBS was forced to respond to its wider obligations, which was reflected in a new 
customer charter emphasising obligations to customers, the community and employees.  It was  
also used as an arm of government policy to change banking culture, especially the bonus culture 
and what the government regards as excessive pay, with overall pay levels being held to the 
median for the industry.  The case suggests that the RBS board has sought to portray an image of 
itself as stewards of the wider interests represented within the firm, especially those of taxpayers 
and government.  There is substantial evidence that the egoist ethics of self-interest have been 
tempered with the appointment of Hester and his management team, the exercise of soft power, 
and a form of sophisticated HRM privileging employee engagement, extensive communications 
and involvement.  Arguably, even this short-term change in ownership has resulted in lessons 
being learned on the problems of over-confident leadership style, a need for HR professionals to 
‘speak up to power’ by helping leaders reflect on their style and ethical behavior (Shipman & 
Mumford, 2011), and over distributional issues such as bonuses and pay (Core & Guay, 2010).   
However, contrary to the predictions and hopes of some academics and practitioners, the GFC 
has not resulted the end of shareholder value and its replacement by a stakeholder model of 
governance in this case due to of a lack of a receptive context for such radical change.   Despite 
what some had expected from left-of-centre government ownership, the demands on banks such 
as RBS to compete globally in both product and executive labour markets and, in this case, the 
government’s desire to return the company to private shareholding ensured that no significant 
attempt was made to enforce a pure stakeholder configuration on RBS.  Thus, the case might also 
be interpreted as providing evidence of a context-dependent configuration in two ways.  First, the 
intent of the UK government to return RBS to the private sector as soon as practicable, the extent 
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to which RBS and financial services in the UK more generally are part of a global industry rather 
than a nationally-bounded one, and the natural instincts of the new leadership team at RBS to 
rescue shareholder value as a model of governance suggest important contextual limitations to 
the application of stakeholder theory in this case  Second, RBS has had to promote an image of 
hard power and commercialism externally, especially to financial markets, the business press 
and, perversely, to government, while exercising soft power and paying large bonuses internally 
to key professional and mobile groups.  Thus, different parts of the business and segments of the 
workforce are likely to be managed very differently, which is also evident from the case.  This, 
less-optimistic, reading suggests that the GFC is likely to have little significant impact in the 
long term on RBS or most other financial services organizations that remain in business. 
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Table 1 Linking Main Theories of Governance through Business Ethics and Strategic Management to SHRM (adapted from Authors, in press) 
Theories of 
Governance 
Business ethics 
perspectives 
Underpinning 
Strategic 
Management 
Theory  
Implications for SHRM and 
Organizational Climate Governance 
Implications for Role of HR  
Traditional Shareholder 
Value Model  
 
Aim: to explain how 
shareholder maximize 
returns on their 
investment 
Egoist Ethics, focusing on 
maximizing self‐interest and 
desires of markets and senior 
executives 
 
 
 
Unitary view of firm 
Focus on returns on human capital and ‘hard’ 
HRM, incl.  cost to income ratios and flexibility 
‘Exclusive’ talent management policy,  
 
Leader‐centric view of organization 
HR as guardians of talent management and advisers on 
value‐adding core employees 
No/limited role in board selection, development and 
remuneration 
HR focus on cost control, with limited strategic role 
 
Newer Shareholder Value 
Theories 
Stewardship Theory and 
Enlightened Shareholder 
Value Model  
 
Aim:  
Concern to rescue 
shareholder value 
Egoist Ethics tempered by: 
Kantian duty to treat people 
with human dignity, and  
morally correct actions on the 
part of  senior executives. 
 
 
 
 
 
Neo‐classical 
economics and 
classical strategic 
management. 
 
 
 
Dynamic  capabilities 
 
 
 
Resource‐based view 
of strategy 
 
 
 
 
Essentially unitary theory of the firm. 
Leaders as guardians of shareholder value, but 
with duties to act as stewards  
‘Soft’ HRM privileging employee engagement  
Balance between ‘exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’ 
talent management policies 
 
Reputation of firm as employer seen as key issue 
Relaxed business case for CSR 
HR as guardians of enlightened/sophisticated approach to 
HRM 
HR as guardians of corporate culture 
HR as guardians of leadership development and potential 
role in board development 
 
Stakeholder Theory  
Aim: Broader 
understanding of 
effectiveness by 
recognizing  wide range of 
legitimate interests in firm 
over economic and non‐
economic goals and values 
Utilitarianism – the greatest 
good for the greatest majority 
 
 
importance of upholding social 
contracts 
Institutional theory 
and new institutional 
economics 
 
Contingency theory 
Essentially pluralist theory of the firm 
Focus on employees as key stakeholders with 
rights and as ‘subjects‐within‐themselves’ 
Soft and hard power and HRM can both be 
justified in different circumstances 
Fairness and tolerance as key principles 
Distributed leadership model 
Reputation of firm for social legitimacy as a core 
concern 
HR as promoters of pluralism, including economic and non‐
economic goals 
HR as promoters of corporate citizenship and ethical 
policies 
HR as promoters of distributed leadership 
 
Context‐dependent 
Organizational Theory 
Aim: To show that 
different corporate 
governance practices and 
goals may be more or less 
effective/acceptable  in 
different contexts  
 
 
No universal governance 
practices 
Relativism, with  morality  and 
ethics seen as context‐
dependent 
 
Organizational 
sociology 
Contingency theory 
and national business 
systems theory 
Resource‐based 
theory and dynamic 
capabilities 
Open systems  
‘No one best way’ of organizing corporate 
governance and HRM 
 
HR needs to be sensitive to context and contributors to  
cost effectiveness, contingent and complementary HR 
policies and practices 
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